Exposing Gauteng’s growing extortion economy – and what to do about it

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Extortion (noun)
The act of getting something, especially money, by force or threats ~ Cambridge Dictionary.

Gauteng is a busy province, South Africa’s most populous – although its smallest according to land area – and is viewed as the country’s financial and economic hub. 

Not surprisingly, with all this activity, Gauteng is also a busy place for organised extortion, according to a new report released in October by the Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime (GI-TOC) and authored by GI-TOC researcher Jenni Irish-Qhobosheane. Calling the shots: The strong arm of extortion in Gauteng delves deep into the extortion economy in the province, identifying four main drivers of the criminal practice and four main extortion economies, which are:

• the construction extortion economy, where gangs and groups calling themselves ‘business forums’ target construction and infrastructure projects and demand a stake in the projects being undertaken.
• the township enterprise extortion economy, where gangs and other criminal groups target formal and informal businesses as well as residents in Gauteng’s townships.
• the water extortion economy, where groups exploit failing infrastructure and water shortages to extort the state and affected communities.
• the transport extortion economy, where elements within the taxi industry extort rival taxi drivers, other transport operators and even drivers of privately owned vehicles.

The rise and entrenchment of these extortion networks, says GI-TOC, is linked in no small way to weaknesses in the state’s counter-extortion capacity and response.

“This is true both in situations where deficiencies in state services have allowed criminal groups to exploit people and businesses, and in situations where the state’s inadequate response to the emergence of extortion has allowed the practice to expand and become entrenched.”

A notable example of how criminal groups involved in extortion have exploited weaknesses in the state’s ability to provide services, says GI-TOC, can be seen in the emergence of the water mafia, which is taking advantage of Gauteng’s current water crisis. This is one more burden for the taxpayer/citizen/resident, who is already buckling under existing endemic corruption, a high cost of living, and the poor delivery of basic services.

There have been numerous media reports on the emergence of this particular form of mafia, with calls for action from provincial and local authorities that, frankly, seem to be at a complete loss as to how to combat the criminality. Another example is found in the taxi industry, where extortion is linked to the state’s inability – or unwillingness – to regulate the sector.

What is driving the extortion economy?

The four main drivers in Gauteng specifically, according to GI-TOC, are:

• the growth of organised crime groups and gangs in the province, many of whom see extortion as a critical arm of their criminal enterprises.
• the concept of risk versus reward, where extortion is seen as an equally lucrative but lower risk activity compared to crimes such as armed robbery or cash-in-transit heists. For example, criminals involved in extortion are unlikely to encounter the kind of armed security that accompanies an armoured van transporting cash or valuables.
• the weakness of the state’s response to emerging extortion markets, which has allowed the practice to spread and become entrenched and normalised.
• the network of criminal actors that has developed and the resultant inter-organisational learning. Extortion is a learned practice, and where it emerges and is successful, it is likely to spread, either because of an inherent drive among criminal groups to expand their power and influence, or because new groups, emboldened by the initial groups’ success, seek to copy their activities.

Gauteng’s extortion criminals operate in both legitimate and illegal markets, says the report. Where extortion is prevalent in the province, criminals will initially target specific vulnerable groups, such as foreign nationals. This activity soon becomes more generalised and widespread as the desire for more influence and profit grows.

Harder to remove a rooted tree

It is vital that the state demonstrates its ability to deal with extortion at an early stage, says the report. Failure to do so makes the state’s job much more challenging – because once extortion networks are entrenched, it is exponentially harder to get rid of them.

GI-TOC agrees, adding that one significant failure on the state’s part is that of not understanding that where extortion proves successful, it spreads quickly. A classic example of this is the construction extortion economy, says the report.

“Had the state acted against the groups involved when this activity first emerged in KwaZulu-Natal in 2016/17, the practice would not have become entrenched and spread to other parts of the country.”

Even worse, says GI-TOC, the criminal groups involved in extortion have “embedded themselves within state structures, further weakening the state’s ability to deal with them effectively”.

The deadly combination of state corruption and the infiltration by criminals into state institutions protects extortionists, giving them access to critical information and supporting their activities. Through these networks they can also buy protection and thus, impunity.

But not content with this level of control, other criminal groups have become involved in political and even electoral processes. “An example of this is the construction extortion economy in Gauteng, where criminal actors have joined the local branches of political parties or have attempted to capture ward councillors through bribery or threats. Councillors who do not co-operate are intimidated, injured or even killed.”

Is there a way forward?

Understanding extortion is key to combating it, write Deborah Bonello, Tuesday Reitano, and Mark Shaw in their publication A handbook for community responses to countering extortion. In due course we will follow this article with an extract from this handbook in which the nature and form of extortion is discussed.

The GI-TOC report highlights key areas that need to be addressed to tackle extortion in Gauteng and recommends steps that should be taken to address the problem. The organisation says that it is equally important to recognise that extortion is now normalised and entrenched, and that the four big extortion economies are “inextricably linked, with criminal actors providing interfaces between the various extortion economies as well as to other criminal economies”.

A holistic approach must therefore be developed, one that will simultaneously address these linkages and the organised nature of the networks. The strategy would need to “disrupt the links between criminal entities involved in extortion and their environment and address the context that has allowed these practices to flourish”.

Crucial elements of the proposed strategy include:

• Channels to safely report extortion, and education as to why reporting is important,
• Data collection, because reliable data is essential in any strategy to counter crime and corruption.
• Development of effective early-warning systems which will identify any emerging extortion activities and allow for swift action to curb them.
• A more cohesive criminal justice response, unlike the current fragmented and inconsistent action.
• The situation of state corruption and infiltration of state structures must be confronted and dealt with urgently.
• Bringing in communities and businesses involved in or affected by extortion, and at state level, the collaboration of all three tiers of government.
• Building community and business resilience to extortion by including them in campaigns and development decisions that will affect their lives, and empowering them to develop their own resilience initiatives.
• Cutting off gangs’ access to firearms and ammunition will cut down on the capacity for violence.

Organised extortion in Gauteng cannot be dealt with by focusing on individual economies, says the report. “It requires an approach that addresses organised extortion as a whole, with a thorough understanding of how the different economies are linked and operate.”

Another crucial element, one that the report does not mention explicitly, is political will, without which no initiative involving the state is likely to be effective. The state must show an appetite for dealing with the corruption in its own ranks and a genuine effort to help its people thrive and prosper without the added burden of intimidation and extortion.